ANNUAL REPORT

GOVERNMENT DEBT MANAGEMENT



2025

Table Contents

Government Debt Management in a nutshell

At the end of December 2024, Government Debt Management (GDM) published it's annual Prospect for the year 2025. According to the Prospect, the aim was to issue Government bonds with a market value of 180 b.kr. during the year. The target was met, and all sales took place by auction. Total issuance came to 192 b.kr., including switch auctions but excluding issuance in connection with the settlement of ÍL Fund.

At the end of 2025, total Central government debt amounted to 2.205 b.kr., or 44.5% of GDP. The Government also held substantial financial assets, including on-lent funds to public entities and deposits with the Central Bank of Iceland denominated in both krónur and foreign currencies. In all, these assets totalled 618 b.kr. at the end of 2025, and the net debt-to-GDP ratio was 32%.

New Government bonds were issued in connection with the settlement of ÍL Fund. Owners of Housing Financing Fund (HFF) bonds received, among other things, Government bonds with a nominal value of 487 b.kr., most of them inflation-linked. This was offset by a reduction in the Government's non-marketable domestic debt and government guarantees The weighted maturity of the Government's domestic debt grew longer as a result of both the settlement and a one-fourth decline in the stock of outstanding Treasury bills during the year. Furthermore, Government on-lending increased due to bonds transferred in connection with the settlement.

In 2025, Standard & Poor's affirmed the Republic of Iceland's credit rating of A+, with a stable outlook; furthermore, Fitch ratings affirmed Iceland's A rating and changed the outlook to positive. In February 2026, Fitch upgraded Iceland's sovereign rating from A to A+, with a stable outlook. In March 2026, Standard & Poor's affirmed Iceland's A+ rating once again but changed the outlook to positive.

In 2025, Government Debt Management concluded a total of 1.082 repurchase agreements (repos) involving Government securities with market making, in the total amount of 467 b.kr.

The Government's financing cost on króna-denominated marketable bonds declined marginally in 2025. Short- and long-term interest rates fell during the year. The Central Bank began publishing constant maturity rates during the year, with the aim of providing a harmonised view of the Government's financing costs at any given time, thereby creating a benchmark for interest rates in the financial market.

I Role, objectives and benchmarks

The Central Bank of Iceland (hereinafter the Bank) under the name Government Debt Management (hereinafter GDM), administers debt for the Government pursuant to a contractual agreement between the Bank and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, dated 29 January 2019. On the basis of the agreement, the Bank handles the issuance of Government bonds in domestic and foreign markets, undertakes a range of tasks relating to Government guarantees and on-lending, supports the market for Government securities, strengthens Iceland's creditworthiness abroad, and provides advice to the Ministry on these matters.

The Bank submits quarterly reports on the administration of domestic and foreign currency Government debt in accordance with debt management criteria set by the Ministry. Each year, the Bank prepares a more detailed report covering the main aspects of Government debt management and borrowing by holders of Government guarantees. GDM's annual report, which focuses on these topics and describes the management of Government debt in 2025, is published here for the first time.

The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs prepares the Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy (MTDS). which is revised and updated annually and explains the Government's plans for debt financing over the horizon of the Strategy. *The Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy for 2025-2029* was published on 30 December 2024. It contained, among other things, objectives concerning the amount and composition of Government debt, together with key risk factors associated with the Central Bank's debt management activities.

In general, the Government's debt management objectives are as follows:

1. To ensure that the Government's financing needs and its payment obligations are met at the lowest possible cost over the long term, consistent with a prudent level of risk;
2. To maintain a sustainable maturity profile that is consistent with the Government's medium-term debt service capacity and minimises refinancing risk;
3. To maintain and promote further development of efficient primary and secondary markets for domestic Government securities;
4. To broaden the Government's investor base and diversify funding sources.

Benchmarks

The aforementioned MTDS also contained criteria for the composition of Government debt, broken down into three categories: nominal (non-inflation-linked). inflation-linked, and foreign currency. Nominal debt shall account for 50-70% of the portfolio, inflation-linked debt 20-30%, and foreign currency debt 15-25%. This structure aims to minimise overall risk in the portfolio and encourage the development of a well-functioning market that can attract a diverse group of investors and set pricing benchmarks for other financial products. As is the case in other countries, primary emphasis is placed on issuance of nominal Government bonds. Issuance of inflation-linked bonds is generally irregular and is determined by financing needs and the circumstances prevailing at any given time. In recent years, the Government's financial need has been met primarily with domestic bond issuance, and foreign currency bonds have been issued mainly to strengthen the international reserves and maintain ready access to foreign markets.

Table I-1 Government debt composition (%)

Debt type	Criteria	Debt composition 31.12.2025	Debt composition w/ swaps
Nominal	50-70	39	39
Inflation-linked	20-30	42	42
Foreign currency	15-25	19	19

Table I-2 Inflation and interest rate swaps in ISK

	New contracts		Expired contracts		Outstanding at year-end	
	Number of contracts	Nominal amount	Number of contracts	Nominal amount	Number of contracts	Nominal amount
2020	2	6,000	0	0	24	34,000
2021	2	10,000	20	26,000	6	18,000
2022	0	0	0	0	6	18,000
2023	0	0	1	3,000	5	15,000
2024	6	14,000	0	0	11	29,000
2025	3	7,000	9	23,000	5	13,000
2026	0	0	4	12,000	1	1,000
2027	0	0	1	1,000	0	0

The average time-to-maturity of total Government debt shall be at least five years and no longer than seven years. The Government's domestic deposits with the Central Bank of Iceland shall average about 40 b.kr.

The Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy for 2026-2030, published on 29 December 2025, contained updated benchmarks for the composition of the debt portfolio. Nominal debt shall account for 45% of the portfolio (deviation band 10%), inflation-linked debt 40% (deviation band 10%), and foreign currency debt 15% (deviation band 5%). The benchmarks for average time-to-maturity and domestic deposits are unchanged. The MTDS also states that following the processing and settlement of ÍL Fund and the changed arrangements for financing of Government credit funds, the Government emphasises the issuance of both nominal and inflation-linked Government securities in the domestic market. This contributes to more effective price formation across the yield curve, thereby laying the foundation for an effective domestic bond market.

II Government debt

Government debt totalled 2.205 b.kr. at the end of 2025, an increase of 342 b.kr. during the year.[1] The increase in Government debt during the year is due primarily to the settlement of ÍL Fund. The debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 41% at the beginning of the year to 44.5% at the year-end. A further breakdown of Government debt can be found in Table 2 in the Appendix.

Chart II-1

Government debt as a percentage of GDP



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Domestic liabilities

The Government's domestic debt totalled 1.796 b.kr. at the end of 2025, after increasing by 262 b.kr. from the prior year, stemming mainly from the aforementioned settlement of ÍL Fund. The debt consisted mainly of Government bonds and Treasury bills.

Treasury bills

Monthly issuance of Treasury bills can vary, depending on investor demand and the Government's financing need at any given time. Bills are also used in Government liquidity management. The outstanding stock of Treasury bills totalled 110 b.kr. at the end of 2025, but issuance contracted during the year, as the Government had ample liquidity due to the sale of its holding in Íslandsbanki. The stock of bills peaked at nearly 198 b.kr. in January. It averaged 136 b.kr. over the course of the year, as compared with the 2024 average of 173 b.kr.

The average bid-to-cover ratio – i.e. the ratio of submitted bids to accepted bids – declined from 1.52 in 2024 to 1.4 in 2025. The weighted average (flat) interest rate on accepted bids was 7.85% in 2025, down from 9.31% in 2024. Over the same period, the Central Bank had lowered its key interest rate by 1.25 percentage points, from 8.50% to 7.25%.

A further breakdown of Treasury bill auctions can be found in Table 3 in the Appendix.

Government bonds

The outstanding stock of Government bonds totalled 1.657 b.kr. at the end of 2025. Nominal bonds totalled 752 b.kr. and inflation-linked bonds 905 b.kr. The balance grew by 581 b.kr. during the year, owing to an increase in Government issuance. The stock of nominal bonds grew by 143 b.kr. and the inflation-linked stock by 439 b.kr. There was strong issuance of new Government bonds in connection with the ÍL Fund settlement.

Table II-1 Government bond issuance regarding the settlement of ÍL-Fund

Auction Bond series Amounts in b.kr.	Nominal amount
RIKS 29 0917	67.0
RIKS 34 1016	60.4
RIKS 36 0815	59.0
RIKS 39 1115	49.0
RIKS 41 0815	50.0
RIKS 44 1017	50.3
RIKS 47 1115	48.0
RIKS 50 0915	47.0
RIKB 32 1015	56.0
Total issued this year	486.7

Chart II-2

Bond auctions



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

1. For the purposes of this report. Government debt refers to Central Government Part A1 debt excluding pension obligations and accounts payable.

Chart II-3

Total issuance of 2025, breakdown by series



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart II-4

Accumulated issuance of Government bonds



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Owners of Housing Financing Fund (HFF) bonds received Government bonds in the nominal amount of just under 487 b.kr., including 431 b.kr. in inflation-linked bonds and 56 b.kr. in nominal bonds.

This was offset by a reduction in the Government's non-marketable domestic debt and government guarantees. This includes only marketable Government bond series and does not account for non-marketable Government debt in the amount of 29 b.kr. at the end of 2025. Virtually all of that debt was inflation-linked and was associated with the Government's purchase of Landsvirkjun and Landsnet, which is discussed further in the next chapter.

In the Government Debt Management *Prospect* for 2025, it was announced that Government bonds would be issued in the amount of 180 b.kr. market value during the year. The target was met, and all sales took place by auction. Total issuance including switch auctions amounted to 192 b.kr. As is customary, issuance in connection with switch auctions in the fourth quarter of the year can be added to the amount provided for in the *Prospect*, as it reduces the need for issuance in the following year.

Chart II-5

Nominal Government bonds

Time to maturity < 5 years

Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart II-6

Nominal Government bonds

Time to maturity > 5 years



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart II-7

Inflation-linked bonds



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

The annual *Prospect* stated as well that there were plans to issue a new nominal Government bond maturing in 2038, and two inflation-linked bonds maturing in 2029 and 2044, respectively. Issuance plans were amended in March, and an inflation-linked bond maturing in 2050 would be issued instead of the one maturing in 2044. The nominal series RIKB 38 0215 was issued in February, and the response was positive. The series was 49 b.kr. in size at the end of the year. Two inflation-linked bonds, RIKS 29 0917 and RIKS 50 0915, were introduced in connection with the settlement of ÍL Fund in June 2025. RIKS 29 0917 was first issued in July and had reached 96 b.kr. by the end of the year. RIKS 50 0915 was first issued in October and had reached 41 b.kr. by the end of the year. Government bond series RIKB 25 0612 matured during the year, with an outstanding amount of 68 b.kr. at maturity.

The Government regularly conducts buybacks and holds switch auctions for bond series that are nearing maturity in order to mitigate refinancing risk. In all, the Government bought just over 50 b.kr. nominal value in RIKB 25 0612 and RIKB 26 0216 during the year.

The overall bid-to-cover ratio in year-2025 auctions was 1.4, which is well in line with the 2024 ratio of 1.44. During the year, the weighted average yield on accepted bids in Government bond auctions was 7.15% for nominal bonds and 3.33% for inflation-linked bonds. For 2024, the same averages were 7.50% and 2.50%, respectively. The decline in nominal bond yields is due primarily to falling market yields in tandem with the reduction in the Central Bank's policy rate in 2025. The rise in inflation-linked bond yields stems from the larger amount issued and the preponderance of short maturities, which bore higher yields because of the inverted yield curve.

Further information on volume sold, terms, and bid-to-cover ratios in specific series can be found in Table 4 in the Appendix.

Table II-2 Owners of Government bonds

Nominal amount in ISK	2024	2025	Change
Pension funds	368,214	873,831	505,617
Mutual and Inv. funds	153,251	172,017	18,766
Insurance companies	70,199	77,705	7,506
Banks and other financial corp.	153,399	166,589	13,190
Foreign investors	104,378	107,034	2,656
Others	76,948	93,325	16,377
Total	926,389	1,490,501	564,112

Each year, attempts are made to ensure effective price formation in two-, five-, and ten-year nominal benchmark series, which by definition have market making agreements. Benchmark series are structured so that each series is large enough to ensure effective price formation in the secondary market. During the year, Government issuance was greatest in the nominal series RIKB 27 0415 and RIKB 38 0215, totalling 106 b.kr. for the two combined.

Closer examination of ownership distribution shows that all owners added to their holdings in krónur terms in 2025, especially the pension funds. This is connected with the settlement of ÍL Fund, as is explained above. Non-residents also added slightly to their Government securities holdings in 2025, and at the year-end they owned about 7.2% of the outstanding stock.

Chart II-8

Net purchases by market participants



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart II-9

Owners of Government bonds and Treasury bills at the end of each year



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Non-marketable debt

The Government's non-marketable domestic debt declined by 240 b.kr. in 2025, to 29 b.kr. at the year-end, owing primarily to the ÍL Fund settlement. The Government's policy has been to reduce non-marketable debt to enhance efficiency and liquidity in the bond market, as marketable bonds are negotiable and are registered electronically on the securities exchange.

At the end of 2025, the Government's main non-marketable debt consisted of what are called the Landsvirkjun bond and the Landsnet bond, which are inflation-linked loans taken for the purchase of shares in the two companies.

The Landsvirkjun bond was issued in connection with the Government's acquisition of the Township of Akureyri's and the City of Reykjavík's holdings in Landsvirkjun. The bond matures in 2034 and is roughly 22.6 b.kr. in size.

At the end of 2022, the Government bought a 93% holding in Landsnet from Landsvirkjun. RARIK (Iceland State Electricity), and Orkubú Vestfjarða. The purchase price of 439 million US dollars, or 63 b.kr., was financed with the issuance of bonds in Icelandic krónur, US dollars, and euros. The króna-denominated debt, which is inflation-linked and bears fixed interest, totalled just over 6 b.kr. at the end of 2025.

Foreign-currency debt

Marketable debt

The Government's foreign currency debt totalled just over 409 b.kr. at the end of 2025, after rising by 80 b.kr. during the year. The increase was due to the issuance, in May, of a bond in the amount of 750 million euros, which matures in 2030, concurrent with the buyback of a bond issued in 2020 and maturing in June 2026. The latter bond was originally issued for 500 million euros, but the outstanding amount after the buyback was 296 million euros. Closer examination of the spread between euro-denominated bonds and euro swap rates shows that the Government's relative interest rate terms improved during the year, especially for the series maturing in 2034.

Non-marketable debt

At the end of 2025, the Government's non-marketable foreign currency debt totalled just under 27 b.kr., a reduction of 7.5 b.kr. between years. The debt stems for the most part from the Government's aforementioned acquisition of a 93% holding in Landsnet.

Chart II-10

Foreign marketable bonds

2028 (EUR)

Source: Bloomberg.

Chart II-11

Foreign marketable bonds

2030 (EUR)

Source: Bloomberg.

Chart II-12

Foreign marketable bonds

2034 (EUR)

Source: Bloomberg.

Table II-3 Debt in foreign currency

Amounts in m.kr. Type	Maturity	Currency	Issued nominal amount	Remaining nominal amount 31.12.25	Nominal amount ISK 31.12.25
Euro medium-term note	2026	EUR	500	296	43,614
Euro medium-term note	2027	EUR	50	50	7,360
Euro medium-term note	2028	EUR	750	750	110,400
Euro medium-term note	2030	EUR	750	750	110,400
Euro medium-term note	2034	EUR	750	750	110,400
Other government debt in foreign currency					26,790
Total					408,964

Government interest expense

The objective of Government debt management is to meet the Government's financial needs at the lowest possible cost that is consistent with a prudent degree of risk. The cost of financing shows mainly in Government interest expense and in the terms negotiated on new borrowings. In assessing developments in costs, it is important to distinguish between the marginal cost of a new issue and the average cost of outstanding debt, as changes in market conditions and interest rates generally affect Government interest expense only gradually.

A policy that minimises costs in the coming year will not necessarily minimise costs over the long term. Other factors can make it difficult to set targets for short-term expense. Because the selected debt management strategy affects market prices, it is difficult to compare the cost of one strategy with the cost of another.

During the year, the Government sought out financing in domestic and foreign markets under variable market conditions. The weighted average yield on new issues reflects the marginal cost of financing during the period, while the weighted average duration shows how refinancing risk is managed. Developments in yields during the year were shaped in particular by changes in domestic monetary policy, developments in inflation, changes in international interest rates, and investors' attitudes towards risk.

The calculations below depict only the cost of debt issuance in the domestic market; i.e., Treasury bills, nominal Government bonds, and inflation-linked Government bonds. Further ahead is a discussion of the cost of marketable foreign currency debt and non-marketable debt in krónur and foreign currencies.

The cost of marketable bonds in Icelandic krónur, including inflation, was 6.2% of the underlying amount in 2025. This is equivalent to 1.9% of GDP for the year. In percentage terms, it declined slightly relative to 2024, when it was 6.8% of the underlying amount, although in 2024 the cost relative to GDP was lower, or 1.8%. The year-on-year drop in relative costs was due to a 1.3 percentage point decline in interest expense on bills and a 1.1 percentage point decline in interest expense on inflation-linked debt. Relative interest expense in previous years and the ratio of costs to GDP can be seen in Chart II-16.

Chart II-13

Foreign marketable bonds

2028 (EUR)



Source: Bloomberg.

Chart II-14

Foreign marketable bonds

2030 (EUR)



Source: Bloomberg.

Chart II-15

Foreign marketable bonds

2034 (EUR)



Source: Bloomberg.

Chart II-16

Central government interest expense



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

The Central Bank began publishing constant maturity rates on 7 November 2025, with the aim of enhancing transparency in interest rate formation and Government financing costs.

Constant maturity rates are calculated and published daily. They reflect the yield on inflation-linked and nominal Government bonds with fixed maturities of three, five, and ten years. The rates are based on the market price of issued Government bonds but are converted so as to reflect a standard final maturity rather than the maturity of specific bonds. The objective of publishing constant maturity rates is to provide a harmonised view of the Government's financing costs at any given time, thereby creating a benchmark for interest rate formation in the financial market.

Particular attention is given to the so-called par interest rate, which is part of the constant maturity rate. Par interest rates show the fixed interest rate a new Government bond would bear if it were issued at par at any given time. Thus they reflect the Government's marginal cost of financing and give a clear view of current market conditions.

Charts II-17 and II-18 show constant maturity rates at year-end 2024 and 2025, respectively. Changes in the yield curve can be detected during the period. reflecting developments in inflation and policy rates, on the one hand, and changes in market expectations about the economic outlook, on the other. Such a presentation also provides insight into how the Government's financing costs have developed over time and how the slope of the yield curve has changed.

Chart II-17

Nominal government yield curve – constant maturity rates



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart II-18

Inflation-linked government yield curve – constant maturity rates



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

International credit ratings

In 2025, Standard & Poor's affirmed the Republic of Iceland's credit rating of A+, with a stable outlook; furthermore, Fitch ratings affirmed Iceland's A rating and changed the outlook to positive. Moody's kept Iceland's sovereign rating unchanged at A1, with a stable outlook.

In February 2026, Fitch upgraded Iceland's sovereign rating from A to A+, with a stable outlook. In March 2026, Standard & Poor's affirmed Iceland's A+ rating once again but changed the outlook to positive.

In addition, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs reported that in recent decades, Iceland had had contractual agreements on credit ratings with Fitch, Moody's, and S&P Global. In autumn 2025, following a tender process, the Ministry had decided to reduce the number of contractually engaged rating agencies from three to two. Thereafter, the Government would maintain a contractual relationship with Moody's Ratings and S&P Global Ratings.

III Risk management

Government debt must be managed within limits set by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. The Ministry puts boundaries on the average time-to-maturity of the debt portfolio, as well as setting targets for maturity profile and benchmark series structure.

It is vital that robust risk management and debt management be in place, so as to minimise borrowing costs and risks. The key risks monitored in the debt management process are liquidity risk, refinancing risk, market risk, counterparty risk, and operational risk.

Liquidity risk

The Government's domestic cash balance with the Central Bank was increased markedly in 2020, owing to the uncertainty associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. As uncertainty has subsided, the cash balance has been reduced again, and at the end of 2025 the domestic balance was 89 b.kr., or 1.9% of GDP.

According to the MTDS, the Government shall engage in active liquidity management with the aim of maintaining an average króna-denominated balance with the Central Bank of 40 b.kr. During the year, the total deposit balance ranged from 16 b.kr. to 156 b.kr., with the fluctuations due primarily to regular shifts in cash flows, such as those stemming from tax payments and the payment of bond principal upon maturity. The cash balance increased markedly, however, with the sale of the Government's remaining holding in Íslandsbanki in May.

The Government took money market loans twice, totalling 21 b.kr. at the peak. It has proven easy for the Government to take short-term money market loans from the banks. On the other hand, the commercial banks' ample cash balance has dampened their interest in accepting deposits from the Government, so that at the end of 2025 the Government had granted only two money market loans during the year, totalling 12 b.kr. at the peak.

The Government's foreign currency deposits totalled 291 b.kr. at the end of 2025. They derive mainly from the issuance of foreign currency bonds to build up Iceland's international reserves. Their value in krónur depends largely on the exchange rate of the króna.

Chart III-1

Government's ISK balance with CBI (% of GDP)

At each year's price level



Sources: Statistics Iceland, Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart III-2

The impact of liquidity management on the Government domestic balance with CBI



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Refinancing risk

Refinancing risk is the risk that new debt must be issued on less favourable terms or that it will not be possible to refinance debt upon maturity. Strong emphasis has been placed on reducing refinancing risk by spreading out maturities. While the size of individual Government bond series is not capped, the ultimate size reflects the aim of keeping the maturity profile as smooth as possible. The largest maturities are in 2026, 2028, and 2030, when marketable euro-denominated and króna-denominated Government bonds are scheduled to mature.

One metric used to measure refinancing risk is the average time-to-maturity of the debt portfolio, which by Government policy must be at least 5 years and no longer than 7 years. Between end-2024 and end-2025, the average time-to-maturity rose from 5 years to 6.8, owing to large-scale Government bond issuance in connection with the ÍL Fund settlement.

Chart III-3

Average time to maturity of Government debt



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart III-4

Maturity profile of Government debt



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Table III-1 Years to maturity

Weighted time to maturity 31.12.2025	
Nominal debt	5.10
Inflation-linked debt	9.46
Foreign currency debt	4.71
Total	6.78

Market risk

In recent years, various actions have been taken to mitigate the Government's market risk, which falls into three categories: exchange rate risk, inflation risk, and interest rate risk.

Exchange rate risk

Until now, foreign currency bonds have been issued primarily to maintain ready access to foreign markets, strengthen the Bank's international reserves, and refinance foreign loans. The Government's foreign currency debt totalled just over 409 b.kr. at the end of 2025, after rising by 80 b.kr. during the year. This debt was offset by foreign currency on-lending to Government entities in the amount of 5.2 b.kr. and foreign currency deposits with the Central Bank, which totalled 295 b.kr. at the end of 2025. The foreign exchange balance of Government foreign assets and liabilities was therefore negative by 109 b.kr. at the end of 2025, whereas it was negative by 62 b.kr. a year earlier. The difference between years is due largely to foreign currency payments relating to the settlement of ÍL Fund.

Inflation risk

Inflation-linked debt totalled 933 b.kr. at the end of 2025 but was offset in part by the Government's inflation-linked claims against other parties, in the amount of 219 b.kr. The indexation imbalance on Government assets and liabilities was therefore negative by 715 b.kr. As of end-2025, inflation-linked debt accounted for 42% of the Government debt portfolio, after adjusting for inflation swaps. This is above the 20-30% benchmark set forth in the MTDS but close to the 40% benchmark (with a 10% deviation band) presented in the MTDS for 2026-2030, which was published at the end of 2025. The rise in the share of inflation-linked debt during the year was due to large-scale issuance of such debt in connection with the aforementioned ÍL Fund settlement.

Inflation swaps are an element in Government risk management. They provide protection against increased indexation on the Government's inflation-linked liabilities, on the one hand, and a rise in the proportion of variable-rate Government debt, on the other. The swaps are structured so that the Government offers to pay variable interest at the IKON

Chart III-5

Credit default swaps on government debt (5 years)

Marketable domestic debt

Source: Bloomberg.

reference rate, which is calculated daily by the Central Bank, while the commercial banks pay fixed inflation-linked interest plus indexation throughout the term of the swap agreement.

GDM began entering into inflation swaps again in December 2024, after a hiatus of several years. The domestic systemically important banks' indexation imbalances have grown very rapidly in the recent term, and by the end of 2025, their combined inflation-linked assets exceeded their inflation-linked liabilities by 707 b.kr. As a result, inflation swaps are beneficial to both parties, as they enable the banking system to reduce the weight of inflation-linked assets in their asset portfolio, while enabling the Government to reduce its inflation-linked liabilities. Three swap agreements were made during the year, in the combined amount of 7 b.kr.

Interest rate risk

The Government's interest rate risk is reflected, for instance, in uncertainty about the terms that will be on offer when older debt matures and is refinanced. Variable-rate bonds also entail interest rate risk, as interest expense changes in line with such factors as changes in the Central Bank's key interest rate. At the end of 2025, only Treasury bills were classified as variable-rate debt in the Government portfolio.

The weight of nominal debt in the Government debt portfolio has declined in the past decades, from 55% at the end of 2014 to 39% as of end-2025. With a smaller share of nominal debt, it becomes more difficult to predict the Government's future interest expense, as exchange rate movements and inflation have a stronger impact on interest expense. This has become particularly important since interest expense has grown to such a large share of overall expenditures.

Interest rate swaps can serve as a means of managing the Government 's interest rate risk. With interest rate swaps, the Government receives fixed nominal interest throughout the term of the swap agreement, while paying variable nominal interest. Increasing the share of Government debt bearing variable interest shortens the Macaulay duration of the portfolio without affecting average time-to-maturity and refinancing risk.

Entering into interest rate swaps with domestic market entities can help lower the Government's interest expense, as the general rule is that such swaps can enable issuers to reduce their interest expense without exacerbating refinancing risk. The Government's counterparty benefits in that interest rate swaps make it easier to conduct internal risk management and offer more diverse financing to individuals and companies, which makes it possible to offer nominal loans at longer maturities than before. There was no demand for interest rate swaps in 2025; therefore, no agreements were made.

The impact of interest rate and inflation swaps

The Government is authorised to enter into interest rate and inflation swap agreements for up to 50 b.kr. per year, in order to better manage the inflation risk and interest rate risk in its debt portfolio. In the inflation swaps the Government has made with the commercial banks, it pays nominal variable interest to the banks (the variable leg) and receives fixed inflation-linked interest in return (the indexed leg). At the end of 2025, five inflation swaps totalling 13 b.kr. were outstanding, and their mark-to-market value was 255 m.kr.

Time is important in swap agreements, as the indexed leg accumulates indexation over the lifetime of the swap. The indexation is paid out when the principal is swapped on the maturity date of the contract. As the swap agreement approaches maturity, its value increases because of the indexation. As a result, the indexed legs of the Government's outstanding inflation swaps have accumulated 290 m.kr. in indexation, which is owned by the Government. The average duration of the indexed legs is 0.18 years. Nominal legs with variable interest rates are the Government's liability, and their average duration is 0.17 years.

Table III-2 Accrued indexation on swaps

M.kr. Legs in swap agreements	Nominal amount w. accrued indexation	Market value	Duration
Indexed fixed-rate leg	13.29	13.39	0.18
Nominal floating-rate leg	13.00	13.20	0.17
Total (assets - liabilities)	0.29	0.19	

The impact of the swap agreements on Government debt can be seen in Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix. It is stated there that the average duration of nominal debt grew shorter in 2025, declining from 3.9 years to 3.8 years. The average duration of inflation-linked debt lengthened from 8.0 years to 8.1, however. The average duration of foreign currency debt was unchanged at 4.3 years, as no foreign currency interest rate swaps were outstanding. The average duration of the total portfolio held unchanged.

Counterparty risk

Counterparty risk is the risk that the Government will suffer a loss caused by the counterparty's failure to honour its obligations. This counterparty risk can materialise in connection with delivery of electronic shares via auction, in repo transactions with primary dealers, and in money market loans granted to the same parties. Potential default on monetary settlement of swap agreements also entails counterparty risk. This risk is minimised in various ways.

Settlement of auctions, repo transactions, or other securities transactions takes place through a structured delivery-versus-payment (DvP) mechanism at the securities depository.

In the case of repo transactions with primary dealers, payment for Government securities is made in cash. A risk surcharge of 5% is added to the selling price of the securities so as to protect the Government from possible losses should the price rise during the term of the swap agreement. In this way, an attempt is made to prevent the Government from suffering a loss if the counterparty does not honour the contract on the repurchase date. In 2025, GDM entered into a total of 1,082 repurchase agreements (repos) with a combined value of ISK 467 b.kr.

In the case of swap agreements, primary collateral is provided in cash at the outset. Additional collateral is also required of primary dealers if the value of the outstanding agreement increases to the Government's benefit.

In the case of money market loans, the Government only accepts safe collateral such as Government-guaranteed securities. Moreover, the value of these securities must equal 105-107% of the amount of the loan in question.

Operational risk

Operational risk that results in financial loss can be caused by human error, faulty procedures, system malfunctions, or external events such as earthquakes, pandemics, or volcanic eruptions. GDM has attempted to minimise this risk; for instance, by introducing procedures for the periodic tasks carried out by the department. These procedures are updated on a regular basis. In its activities, the department aims to ensure that employees can substitute for one another.

The Bloomberg trading system is used for auctions and buybacks carried out by GDM. The same system is used to handle both repo transactions with primary dealers and transactions involving money market loans. The Nasdaq trading system is used to buy securities in the secondary market, particularly bonds with a short time to maturity, so as to mitigate the Government's repayment risk.

The Central Bank has put in place a comprehensive trading and administration system, called Wallstreet Suite, for front-office, mid-office, and back-office employees. The system greatly enhances operational security, reduces the risk of human error, and facilitates debt and risk management.

The Internal Auditor and the Risk Management unit in the Central Bank evaluate procedures and other aspects of GDM's internal work. The Bank has adopted highly specific rules on employees' authorisations to trade in listed securities. Employees must seek permission from the Compliance Officer for their personal securities trades.

IV Government guarantees and on-lending

Government guarantees

As is provided for in Article 1 of the Act on Government Guarantees. no. 121/1997, the Government may not grant a guarantee without explicit statutory authorisation. Unless otherwise provided for by law, the guarantee must take the form of a simple State guarantee. The risk to the Government must be minimised, and collateral provided must be deemed satisfactory by the State Guarantee Fund. The State Guarantee Fund oversees Government guarantees, monitors the activities of entities that have received them, and maintains a record of the obligations bearing such guarantees.

Government guarantees pose risk for the Government, in that they represent indirect financial obligations that could fall on the Government and disrupt public finances if the debtor cannot pay its obligations when due. Government guarantees are not recognised as liabilities on the Government's balance sheet until the guarantee is activated. This could mask the actual state of public finances and complicate financial analysis. The outstanding balance of Government guarantees has declined markedly in recent years, in line with Government policy. At the end of 2025, Government guarantees totalled just over 106 b.kr., as compared with 736 b.kr. at the end of 2024. This steep decline is due almost entirely to the settlement and winding-up of ÍL Fund. Guarantees equalled about 2.1% of GDP at the end of 2025, down from 16.2% at the end of 2024. They accounted for 4.8% of the Government's outstanding liabilities at the end of 2025, as compared with 39.5% a year earlier.

Chart IV-1

Government guarantees - maturity profile



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

As of end-2025, just over half of Government guarantees were due to obligations originally issued by the Icelandic Student Loan Fund (52%), 21% were due to Landsvirkjun's obligations, and 15% were due to the ÍL Fund's outstanding obligations. The last of these were assumed by the Government in January 2026, when ÍL Fund was wound up. All outstanding Government guarantees are in Icelandic krónur except Landsvirkjun's, which are denominated in euros. Of the 106 b.kr. in

Table IV-1 State guarantees at year-end 2025

	Balance at year-end		Change y-o-y		
M.kr.	2025	2024	m.kr.	%	Proportion
State guarantees total	106,196	736,241	-630,045	-85.6	100
Lending agencies	78,972	708,740	-629,768	-88.9	74.4
HF fund	15,567	642,080	-626,513	-97.6	14.7
Icelandic regional development institute	8,035	8,988	-953	-10.6	7.6
Icelandic student loan fund	55,369	57,671	-2,302	-4.0	52.1
Co-operative and limited partnerships	26,837	26,300	536	2.0	25.3
National power company sf.	22,080	21,585	495	2.3	20.8
Isavia ohf.	854	890	-36	-4.0	0.8
RUV ohf. (National broadcasting service)	3,902	3,825	77	2.0	3.7
Other	387	1,201	-813	-67.7	0.4
Business supplemental and support loans	387	1,201	-813	-67.7	0.4
State guarantees as % of GDP	2.1	16.2			
% of state guarantees to total debt	4.8	39.5			

Government guarantees, 31 b.kr., or 29%, mature in 2026. The largest share of this portion stems from an obligation owed by Landsvirkjun in the amount of 150 million euros (22 b.kr.), which matures in July.

The balance of Government guarantees increased in 2020, partly because of a pandemic-related law on financial assistance to small operating entities. The guarantees pertained to special support loans and supplemental loans from financial institutions. Support loans were intended for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and could range up to 40 m.kr. The first 10 m.kr. of the loans bore a 100% guarantee, while amounts in excess of that threshold bore a guarantee of 85%. At the peak in mid-2021, the stock of support loans totalled 10 b.kr. By the end of 2025, the outstanding balance of active support loans was 441 m.kr., including 387 m.kr. bearing a State guarantee. In comparison, the outstanding balance of active support loans was 1.3 b.kr. at the end of 2024 and Government guarantees on them equalled 1.2 b.kr. The Government's total payments to date in connection with support loans equal 916 m.kr. Supplemental loans were intended for medium-sized and large firms, and each loan could range up to 1.2 b.kr. The State guarantee covered a maximum of 70% of the loan amount. Supplemental loans totalled 2.8 b.kr. at the outset but had been paid in full by March 2024. The Government made no payments in connection with these loans.

Chart IV-2
On-lending
In end of 2025



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart IV-3
On-lending, maturity profile



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Government on-lending

Government on-lending is a practice by which the Government takes funds from its own borrowings and loans them onwards to non-Part A1 Government entities. The grant of such loans requires authorisation in the National Budget or in special legislation. The authorisation for Government on-lending in the fiscal budget and budget supplement for 2025 totalled 45.9 b.kr. On-lent funds amounted to 234 b.kr. at year-end 2025, as compared with 127 b.kr. at year-end 2024. The increase is due primarily to the settlement and winding-up of ÍL Fund, as bonds issued in July 2022, with an outstanding balance of 109 b.kr., were recategorised as on-lent funds at the end of 2025. If adjustments are made for this transfer and for prepayments received, net on-lending increased by 28 b.kr., or 22% in 2025.

At the end of 2025 just over 81% of Government on-lending was to the Housing Fund, 8% to the Icelandic Regional Development Institute, 7% to the Vaðlaheiðargöng tunnel, and 2% to the Icelandic Student Loan Fund.

A large share of on-lent funds, about 94%, were inflation-linked at the end of 2025. Another 4% were non-inflation-linked, and 2% were in foreign currency.

Table IV-2 Annual on-lending limits

B.kr.	2025	
Borrowers	Limit	Utilization
Transport for the capital area	7	2.6
Icelandic regional development institute	5	5.0
University of Iceland real estate ehf.	2	0.0
The Government Property Agency	1.5	0.0
Housing fund	20	15.9
The Icelandic Student Loan Fund	10	4.0
Þórkatla real estate ehf.	0.4	
Total	45.9	27.5

Government guarantees fees and risk fees

Entities whose loans bear a State guarantee pay a fee to the Government, either a State guarantee fee or a risk fee, pursuant to the aforementioned Act on State

Guarantees. In 2025, guarantee fees totalled 132 m.kr., an increase of 3.5% from the 2024 total of 128 m.kr.

In 2025, risk fees totalling 49 m.kr. (48 m.kr. in 2024) were paid by Vaðlaheiðargöng hf.

Table IV-3 Government guarantee fee

M.kr.	2025	2024	Change y-o-y m.kr.	Change y-o-y %	Hlutdeild. %
Icelandic Regional Development Institute	59.9	53.2	6.7	12.6	45.3
The National Power Company of Iceland	72.3	74.5	-2.2	-3.0	54.7
Total	132.1	127.7	4.5	3.5	100.0

Appendix

Chart 1

Central government debt, breakdown by type

31 December 2025



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart 2

Owners of Government bonds

31 December 2025



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart 3

Owners of Treasury bills

31 December 2025



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart 4

Outstanding amounts in repo agreements



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart 5

Bid to cover ratio of Government bonds



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart 6

Change in ownership of Government bonds 2025



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart 7

Central government debt 2017 -2025



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Chart 8

Foreign holdings of Government securities



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Table 1 Debt management criteria and objectives

Criteria	Objective	Status on 31.12.25
1. Maturity profile The government's maturity profile should be as smooth as possible over the long-term and should minimize refinancing risk. The final size of the series shall take account of that objective.	As smooth as possible	The aim of the Government is that the maturity profile of its debts will be as smooth as possible. The size of outstanding series at year-end is between 41-137 b.kr. with the single largest maturity date in July 2030. when RIKS 30 0701 in the amount of 137 b.kr. matures.
2. Benchmark issues Benchmark issues will be structured so that each series is large enough to ensure effective price formation in the secondary market. The number and size of the series shall take account of Government debt. The objective is for the final size of each issued series to be at least 40 b.kr.. although with the exception that when a bond is issued for only two years. the target size shall be at least 15 b.kr.	Liquidity	At year-end there were 13 benchmark issues maturing between 2026 and 2050. All benchmark issues have reached their minimum size.
3. Time to maturity Average time to maturity should be at least 5 years and no longer than 7 years	Min. 5 years and max. 7 years	The average time to maturity of the debt portfolio was 6.78 years at the end of 2025.
4. Deposits The Government's domestic deposits with the Central Bank of Iceland shall average about ISK 40 b.kr.	40 b.kr.	The Government's domestic deposits were lower than 40 b.kr. for 58 days in 2025. The deposits were 77 b.kr. on average in 2025.

Table 1 Government debt

M.kr.	Years to maturity	Balance at beg. of year	2025Q3	Balance at year-end	Change in Q4	Change y-o-y
Total debt	6.87	1,863,245	2,078,969	2,204,953	125,984	341,708
Domestic debt	7.39	1,533,876	1,755,119	1,795,990	40,870	262,114
Marketable debt	7.45	1,265,354	1,724,862	1,767,248	42,386	501,894
T - bills	0.16	189,610	131,348	110,150	-21,198	-79,460
Nominal Government bonds	5.82	609,688	689,996	752,442	62,446	142,754
RIKB 25 0612	0.00	88,859	0	0	0	-88,859
RIKB 26 1015	0.79	72,924	90,334	90,334	0	17,410
RIKB 27 0415	1.29	71,051	123,463	129,438	5,975	58,387
RIKB 28 1115	2.87	118,882	124,037	124,037	0	5,155
RIKB 31 0124	5.07	124,632	124,632	124,632	0	0
RIKB 32 1015	6.79	0	67,600	67,600	0	67,600
RIKB 35 0917	9.71	67,257	86,210	94,141	7,931	26,884
RIKB 38 0215	12.13	0		48,541	48,541	48,541
RIKB 42 0217	16.13	66,082	73,719	73,719	0	7,637
Inflation-linked Government bonds	9.69	466,056	903,519	904,656	1,137	438,600
RIKS 26 0216	0.13	118,694	91,731	75,675	-16,056	-43,019
RIKS 29 0917	3.71	0	84,406	96,414	12,008	96,414
RIKS 30 0701	4.50	132,253	137,035	137,176	140	4,922
RIKS 33 0321	7.22	129,332	134,009	134,144	135	4,812
RIKS 34 1016	8.79	0	62,695	64,235	1,541	64,235
RIKS 36 0815	10.62	0	61,431	61,493	63	61,493
RIKS 37 0115	11.04	85,777	88,880	89,290	410	3,513
RIKS 39 1115	13.87	0	50,896	50,947	51	50,947
RIKS 41 0815	15.62	0	52,060	52,113	53	52,113
RIKS 44 1017	18.79	0	52,269	52,322	53	52,322
RIKS 47 1115	21.87	0	49,857	49,908	50	49,908
RIKS 50 0915	24.71	0	38,250	40,939	2,689	40,939
Non-marketable debt	3.79	268,522	30,257	28,741	-1,516	-239,781
Landsvirkjun	4.51	24,034	22,531	22,554	23	-1,480
ÍLS Vtr 0.87% 04 Jan 2032	0.00	132,280	0	0	0	-132,280
ÍLS Vtr 0.52% 03 Jan 2029	0.00	103,260	0	0	0	-103,260
ÍLS - nominal	0.00	1	0	0	0	-1
Landsnet	1.15	8,947	7,726	6,187	-1,539	-2,760
Foreign debt	4.58	329,369	323,850	408,964	85,114	79,594
Marketable bonds	4.53	294,995	294,995	382,174	87,179	87,179
Non-marketable debt	0.75	34,374	28,855	26,790	-2,065	-7,585
RARIK	1.16	3,514	2,570	2,122	-447	-1,392
Landsvirkjun sf - USD	1.16	16,471	12,045	9,948	-2,098	-6,523
Landsvirkjun sf - EUR	0.41	14,390	14,240	14,720	480	330

Table 2 Treasury bill auctions

M.kr.

Auction date	Issues	Bids. nominal value	Accepted nominal value	Yield	Bid to cover ratio
13.01.25	RIKV 25 0416	32,435	29,935	8.41	1.08
13.01.25	RIKV 25 0820	25,600	23,300	8.25	1.10
17.02.25	RIKV 25 0521	8,130	5,430	8.10	1.50
17.02.25	RIKV 25 0820	20,900	9,950	8.10	2.10
17.03.25	RIKV 25 0521	9,836	8536	8.05	1.15
17.03.25	RIKV 25 0917	22,742	21,342	8.05	1.07
14.04.25	RIKV 25 0716	11,230	9,730	7.95	1.15
14.04.25	RIKV 25 1015	31,730	27,230	7.95	1.17
19.05.25	RIKV 25 0820	10,130	2,680	7.80	3.78
19.05.25	RIKV 25 1119	18,300	8,200	7.78	2.23
06.06.25	RIKV 25 0917	2,300	1,800	7.70	1.28
06.06.25	RIKV 25 1217	20,000	19,400	7.70	1.03
14.07.25	RIKV 25 1119	38,212	19,612	7.65	1.95
18.08.25	RIKV 25 1119	18,188	16,088	7.68	1.13
18.08.25	RIKV 26 0318	25,800	19,800	7.65	1.30
15.09.25	RIKV 26 0318	31,718	21,018	7.60	1.51
13.10.25	RIKV 26 0121	19,940	17,840	7.61	1.12
13.10.25	RIKV 26 0415	30,387	20,387	7.60	1.49
17.1.25	RIKV 26 0318	21,205	12,105	7.50	1.75
17.11.25	RIKV 26 0520	39,650	19,000	7.50	2.09
Total		438,433	313,383	7.85	1.40

Table 4 Government bonds issuance[1]

M.kr.

Issues	Total bids	Accepted bids	Bid to cover ratio	Additional issuance[2]	Total issuance	Yield, %
Nominal issuance						
RIKB 26 1015	19,481	16,771	1.16	395	17,161	7.73
RIKB 27 0415	79,027	57,327	1.38	1,442	58,779	7.56
RIKB 28 1115	5,422	4,538	1.19	275	4,794	7.39
RIKB 35 0917	31,316	26,072	1.20	1,220	27,305	6.78
RIKB 38 0215	68,549	45,118	1.52	2,247	47,308	6.71
RIKB 42 0217	8,480	5,752	1.47	389	6,062	6.56
Total	212,275	155,578	1.32	5,968	161,408	7.15
Inflation-linked issuance						
RIKS 29 0917	37,267	22,467	1.66	781	22,467	3.45
RIKS 37 0115	601	273	2.20	0	273	2.55
RIKS 50 0915	5,976	3,020	1.98	0	3,020	2.72
Total	43,844	25,760	2.20	781	25,760	3.36
Switch auctions						
RIKB 38 0215	490	388	1.26	0	388	6.24
RIKS 29 0917	4,358	4,332	1.01	0	4,332	3.16
Total	4,848	4,720	1.03	0	4.720	3.41
Total issuance	260,967	186,058	1.40	6,749	191,889	6.32

1. The table shows market value in accordance with the GDM prospect for the year.
2. This is a 10% purchase option on accepted bids that bidders are entitled to exercise two days after the auction date.

Table 5 Effects of swaps on Government debt

M.kr.	Nominal amount with accrued indexation	Market value	Proportion, %	Duration
Government debt				
Nominal debt	862,592	871,460	39	3.86
Inflation-linked debt	933,397	976,064	42	8.02
Foreign currency debt	408,964	417,142	19	3.86
Total	2,204,953	2,264,667	100	5.65
Nominal debt	870,592	879,639	39	3.82
Inflation-linked debt	925,107	967,691	42	8.08
Foreign currency debt	408,964	417,142	19	3.86
Total	2,204,663	2,264,472	100	5.65

Table 6 Composition of Government debt by interest rate type

	Without swaps		With swaps	
M.kr.	Nominal amount with accrued indexation	Proportion, %	Nominal amount with accrued indexation	Proportion, %
Icelandic fixed interest rates	752,442	34	747,442	34
Icelandic inflation-linked interest rates	933,397	42	925,107	42
Icelandic floating interest rates	110,150	5	123,150	6
Foreign fixed interest rates	408,964	19	408,964	19
Foreign floating interest rates	0	0	0	0
Total	2,204,953	100	2,204,663	100

Table 7 Owners of Government bonds 31.12.25

Nominal value in m.kr.	Banks and other. financial corp	Mutual and inv. Funds	Pension funds	Firms	Insurance companies	Households	Others	Foreign investors	Total
RIKB 26 1015	47,977	14,205	4,633	6,372	1,889	922	2	15,635	91,634
RIKB 27 0415	62,589	23,223	16,163	12,691	3,621	1,714	52	9,384	129,438
RIKB 28 1115	27,586	24,075	34,865	9,440	9,653	2,674	8,471	7,324	124,087
RIKB 31 0124	1,841	18,201	64,486	6,118	9,187	2,365	6,550	17,241	125,988
RIKB 32 1015	200	3,440	63,277	0	683	0	0	0	67,600
RIKB 35 0917	1,960	20,922	34,902	1,673	10,255	558	866	23,062	94,197
RIKB 38 0215	735	10,140	18,726	1,331	8,154	439	483	11,284	51,292
RIKB 42 0217	482	8,441	32,527	1,056	9,180	94	824	21,816	74,421
RIKS 26 0216	18,033	7,095	9,555	7,959	4,617	3,682	261	181	51,383
RIKS 29 0917	529	12,332	72,246	1,804	5,475	640	240	3	93,269
RIKS 30 0701	1,253	9,700	57,092	1,116	7,486	1,527	678	21	78,873
RIKS 33 0321	1,943	9,631	58,985	1,067	3,577	2,040	2,328	71	79,641
RIKS 34 1016	73	549	58,209	776	1,054	526	15	571	61,774
RIKS 36 0815	0	500	58,500	0	0	0	0	0	59,000
RIKS 37 0115	790	4,735	62,552	502	1,801	195	164	105	70,845
RIKS 39 1115	0	820	48,080	0	100	0	0	0	49,000
RIKS 41 0815	0	770	49,230	0	0	0	0	0	50,000
RIKS 44 1017	149	886	45,239	1,415	644	1,258	386	336	50,313
RIKS 47 1115	0	700	47,300	0	0	0	0	0	48,000
RIKS 50 0915	448	1,652	37,265	50	330	0	0	0	39,745
Total	166,589	172,017	873,831	53,372	77,705	18,633	21,320	107,034	1,490,501

Table 8 Government bond auctions

Date	Issues	Bids, market value	Bids, nominal value	No. of bids	No. of acc. bids	Yield %	Acc. market value	Acc. nominal value	Additional issuance, nominal value	Total issuance, market value
Nominal Government bonds										
10.1.2025	RIKB 27 0415	8,806	8,748	37	31	7.64	6,793	6,748	0	6,793
10.1.2025	RIKB 35 0917	7,076	6,872	32	27	6.60	6,304	6,122	0	6,304
24.1.2025	RIKB 27 0415	6,443	6,405	31	27	7.67	5,035	5,005	189	5,225
24.1.2025	RIKB 35 0917	5,120	5,005	22	17	6.68	4,005	3,915	161	4,170
7.2.2025	RIKB 27 0415	8,541	8,486	31	26	7.64	6,780	6,736	391	7,173
7.2.2025	RIKB 42 0217	3,819	4,795	18	14	6.51	3,182	3,995	389	3,492
21.2.2025	RIKB 38 0215	17,163	17,431	63	45	6.68	13,175	13,381	600	13,766
7.3.2025	RIKB 26 1015	8,085	8,215	16	11	7.80	6,707	6,815	80	6,786
7.3.2025	RIKB 38 0215	8,356	8,540	30	19	6.75	5,616	5,740	290	5,900
4.4.2025	RIKB 27 0415	6,819	6,781	23	16	7.68	5,060	5,031	175	5,236
4.4.2025	RIKB 38 0215	4,762	4,830	21	20	6.66	4,565	4,630	0	4,565
11.4.2025	RIKB 26 1015	11,396	11,550	20	17	7.68	10,064	10,200	315	10,375
11.4.2025	RIKB 35 0917	3,514	3,462	17	15	6.79	3,230	3,182	160	3,392
9.5.2025	RIKB 27 0415	7,863	7,800	27	24	7.52	7,157	7,100	362	7,522
9.5.2025	RIKB 38 0215	7,095	7,250	29	20	6.75	4,844	4,950	300	5,138
23.5.2025	RIKB 27 0415	8,920	8,850	24	16	7.51	5,897	5,850	0	5,897
23.5.2025	RIKB 42 0217	2,112	2,660	13	7	6.56	1,278	1,610	0	1,278
6.6.2025	RIKB 27 0415	1,828	1,815	11	8	7.53	1,561	1,550	0	1,561
6.6.2025	RIKB 35 0917	6,320	6,300	22	17	6.95	5,147	5,130	283	5,431
20.6.2025	RIKB 28 1115	5,422	5,830	20	16	7.39	4,538	4,880	275	4,794
20.6.2025	RIKB 38 0215	4,959	5,151	34	9	6.95	1,078	1,120	102	1,177
18.7.2025	RIKB 27 0415	10,826	10,781	34	15	7.69	5,421	5,398	0	5,421
8.8.2025	RIKB 38 0215	6,276	6,520	24	14	6.95	3,869	4,020	397	4,251
5.9.2025	RIKB 27 0415	12,591	12,527	22	4	7.60	7,917	7,877	0	7,917
5.9.2025	RIKB 38 0215	12,821	13,218	48	17	6.86	5,459	5,628	558	6,000
19.9.2025	RIKB 42 0217	2,549	3,243	17	9	6.68	1,291	1,643	0	1,291
3.10.2025	RIKB 35 0917	9,285	9,195	41	29	6.86	7,387	7,315	616	8,009
7.11.2025	RIKB 38 0215	7,116	7,045	14	9	6.37	6,510	6,445	0	6,510
21.11.2025	RIKB 27 0415	6,388	6,325	20	16	7.16	5,707	5,650	325	6,034
Total		212,275	215,630				155,578	157,666	5,968	161,408
Inflation-linked Government bonds										
04.07.25	RIKS 29 0917	15,180	14,685	53	24	3.40	7,908	7,650	0	7,908
18.07.25	RIKS 29 0917	8,660	8,391	38	9	3.54	3,576	3,465	160	3,741
22.08.25	RIKS 29 0917	3,857	3,720	18	12	3.56	3,069	2,960	77	3,148
03.10.25	RIKS 29 0917	9,570	9,191	31	24	3.42	7,102	6,821	545	7,670
17.10.25	RIKS 50 0915	5,064	4,300	24	13	2.75	2,473	2,100	0	2,473
07.11.25	RIKS 50 0915	911	750	7	6	2.58	547	450	0	547
21.11.25	RIKS 37 0115	601	550	4	2	2.55	273	250	0	273
Total		43,844	41,587				24,948	23,696	781	25,760
Switch auctions										
05.12.25	RIKB 38 0215	490	480	4	3	6.24	388	380	0	388
05.12.25	RIKS 29 0917	4,358	4,307	14	12	3.16	4,332	4,107	0	4,332
Total		4,848	4,787				4,720	4,487	0	4,720